


















CESIFO WORKING PAPER NO. 2914 
CATEGORY 1: PUBLIC FINANCE 
JANUARY 2010 
 
PRESENTED AT THE 6






An electronic version of the paper may be downloaded  
• from the SSRN website:              www.SSRN.com 
• from the RePEc website:              www.RePEc.org 









In the absence of financing frictions, profit taxes reduce investment by their effect on the user 
cost of capital. With finance constraints due to moral hazard, investment becomes sensitive to 
cash-flow and own equity of firms. We propose a corporate finance model of investment and 
derive three central results: (i) Even small taxes impose first order welfare losses on 
financially constrained firms; (ii) ACE and cashflow tax systems, which are investment 
neutral in the neoclassical model, are no longer neutral when firms are finance constrained. 
(iii) When banks are active and provide external finance together with monitoring services, 
the two systems not only reduce investment, but are also no longer equivalent. With active 
banks, investment is subject to double moral hazard and the timing of tax payments becomes 
important. The ACE system gives tax relief at the return stage and provides better incentives 
than a cash-flow tax which gives tax relief upfront. 
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Johannes Becker. 1 Introduction
When discussing the eﬀects of proﬁtt a x a t i o no nﬁrms’ investment decisions and eﬃciency,
the tax reform literature often relies on models with full information where ﬁrms have
unimpeded access to external capital. Accordingly, investment is expanded until the
marginal return is equal to the user cost of capital. Taxes aﬀect investment only by
their impact on the user cost (cf. Jorgenson, 1963, and Auerbach, 2002, for a recent
review). The corporate ﬁnance literature, however, provides substantial evidence that
the relationship between ﬁrms and outside investors is subject to information problems
that tend to limit the amount of external funds ﬁrms are able to raise (cf. the surveys
in Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Stein, 2003). Typically, outside investors cannot verify
whether the owners of the ﬁrm and their management team exert enough eﬀort or put all
available funding to the intended use. The corporate governance mechanisms that must
consequently be set up to ensure that external investors receive the appropriate returns
can importantly reduce, but not entirely eliminate the problem, and are costly. Hence,
ﬁrms with proﬁtable investment opportunities are often subject to ﬁnance constraints,
which prevent them from investing the desired, ﬁrst best amount of capital (see, among
others, Hubbard, 1998; Tirole, 2001, 2006; Aghion, Fally, and Scarpetta, 2007).
This paper investigates the impact of proﬁt taxes on investment when ﬁrms are ﬁnance
constrained.1 The analysis rests on a stylized corporate ﬁnance model similar to Holm-
strom and Tirole (1997) and Tirole (2006), in which managerial eﬀort of entrepreneurs is
not observable to outsiders. Firms’ capacity to raise credit then depends on the amount
of pledgeable income they can credibly promise as a repayment to banks. Investment
becomes sensitive to cash-ﬂow and own assets. Empirical studies measuring the cash-ﬂow
sensitivity of total investment often ﬁnd that investment expands by a factor of 1.2-1.3
per Dollar of additional free cash-ﬂow (cf. Fazzari and Petersen, 1993; Calomiris and
Hubbard, 1995; Carpenter and Petersen, 2002). Diminished internal ﬁnancial resources
thus lead to a cut in external funding and investment. Proﬁt taxes impair investment
1For feedback eﬀects of taxes on corporate governance issues see Desai and Dharmapala (2008, 2009).
1not only by raising the user cost of capital, but also by reducing the ﬁrm’s pledgeable
income and its ﬁnancing capacity. Since corporate tax rates vary between 20-40% in many
countries (cf. OECD, 2007), the resulting reduction in investment can be substantial.
The mechanism by which taxes aﬀect investment is fundamentally diﬀerent from the
neoclassical model with full information and unconstrained investment. Taking account
of credit constraints, this paper derives three important results. We ﬁr s ts h o wt h a tp r o ﬁt
taxes, by eroding cash-ﬂow and pledgeable income, tighten ﬁnance constraints and reduce
investment levels, independent of their eﬀect on the user cost of capital. For this reason,
even a small tax rate imposes a ﬁrst order welfare loss. Taxes thus aggravate a preexisting
distortion when ﬁrms are ﬁnance constrained in the absence of tax. Eﬃciency costs are
higher when credit constraints are tight, for instance because ﬁrms have few own assets
but large investment opportunities. To illustrate the quantitative welfare implications,
we calibrate a small model based on stylized empirical facts and show that the marginal
cost of public funds in the presence of credit constraints can signiﬁcantly surpass the
corresponding tax cost in the standard unconstrained investment model.
Our second result demonstrates that neither a cash-ﬂow nor an ACE (Allowance for
Corporate Equity) tax system is neutral when ﬁrms are ﬁnance constrained. In the
conventional, neoclassical framework, these two tax systems are investment neutral and
equivalent when both are required to raise the same present value of tax revenue. The
cash-ﬂow tax (recommended by Meade, 1978) allows immediate expensing of investment
costs, but denies deduction of ﬁnancing costs, i.e. interest on debt or imputed interest on
equity. The ACE system (as proposed by the Capital Taxes Group of the Institute for
Fiscal Studies, 1991) denies immediate investment depreciation but, instead, allows ﬁrms
to deduct all costs of ﬁnance, an imputed return on equity in addition to interest on debt.
In both cases, debt and equity are treated equally. Since only economic rents are subject
to tax, they are neutral with respect to the investment decision in the absence of ﬁnance
constraints (see King, 1975; Sandmo, 1979; Boadway and Bruce, 1984, for models under
certainty, and Bond and Devereux, 1995, 2003, under uncertainty).
2Due to their eﬃciency properties, these alternative tax systems feature prominently in
current discussions of tax reform (e.g. Devereux and Sorensen, 2005; OECD, 2007; Auer-
bach, Devereux, and Simpson, 2008). The U.S. President’s Advisory Panel on Federal
Tax Reform (2006) suggested a cash-ﬂow tax while the recommendation of the upcoming
Mirrlees Review on ‘Reforming the Tax System for the 21st Century’ is not yet known
but seems to lean towards an ACE system (Griﬃth, Hines, and Sorensen, 2008; Craw-
ford and Freedman, 2008). Variants of the ACE tax have already been implemented in
Croatia, Austria, Belgium, Italy, and Brazil (Klemm, 2007). Our second main result then
shows that when ﬁrms are ﬁnance constrained, neither cash-ﬂow nor ACE tax systems are
investment neutral any more. Irrespective of the fact that both systems fully eliminate
the tax wedge between the user cost of capital and the market interest rate, they still
reduce ﬁrms’ pledgeable income and investment levels, although to a smaller extent than
a tax system without expensing of investment or interest costs. In spite of the detrimental
impact on investment, however, we still ﬁnd the two tax systems to be equivalent as long
as bank ﬁnancing of ﬁr m si sc o m p e t i t i v ea n dp a s s i v e .
Yet, in practice, banks often play a more involved role and provide monitoring ser-
vices and advice (cf. Diamond, 1984). In fact, the quality of these services might be
considered an important aspect of ﬁnancial development. Desai, Foley and Hines (2004)
report, for example, that multinational companies face substantially diﬀerent ﬁnancing
costs in diﬀerent countries. Our third main result therefore relates to a situation where
banks’ monitoring eﬀort improves the success prospects of ﬁrms. The non-contractibility
of monitoring leads to a double moral hazard problem where not only entrepreneurial
eﬀort but also the banks’ monitoring importantly determine the prospects for successful
investment. The timing of tax liabilities then becomes important. While the cash-ﬂow
tax provides tax relief upfront, the ACE tax gives relief at the late return stage when the
cash-ﬂow accrues, but leads to higher outstanding debt. For this reason, an ACE system
provides better incentives for monitoring in a situation of double moral hazard. It leads
to higher success probabilities and investment levels when both alternatives are required
to raise the same amount of tax revenue! Since investment scale and monitoring eﬀort
3are too low even in an untaxed equilibrium, the ACE system is superior in welfare terms.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 sets up the basic model with ﬁnance con-
strained investment. It studies two speciﬁc tax regimes, cash-ﬂow and ACE tax systems,
and shows that they are equivalent but not neutral when ﬁrms are credit constrained.
Section 3 derives the superiority of the ACE compared to the cash-ﬂow tax when banks
supply credit together with productive monitoring. Section 4 concludes.
2T h e B a s i c M o d e l
2.1 Full Information Benchmark
The analysis is based on a one period model of investment with risk-neutral entrepreneurs.
Investment I is successful with probability p.I n t h i s c a s e , t h e ﬁrm’s end of period
value is I + f (I) where the cash-ﬂow function satisﬁes f0 (I) > 0 >f 00 (I).I ft h eﬁrm
fails, the end of period value is zero. If a unit of capital were invested in the deposit
market, it would yield a safe rate of return r a n dl e a dt oa ne n do fp e r i o dv a l u ee q u a l
to R ≡ 1+r. Given an opportunity cost of capital equal to IR, the net value of the
investment is π = p(I + f) − IR in the absence of tax.2 An investment with a safe
return r is equivalent to a risky investment with a return i only in the good state if the
no-arbitrage condition p(1 + i)=R is satisﬁed. Using this, the expected end of period
value is equal to π = p(f − iI). In the absence of tax and ﬁnancial frictions, the value
maximizing investment scale is given by f0 (I)=i.
We ﬁrst show how proﬁt taxation changes this investment rule. Suppose that the
entrepreneur is endowed with own assets or inside equity A and self-ﬁnances part of the
investment. If the government grants an investment subsidy τsI by allowing a share s of
investment outlays to be deducted from the tax base, where τ is a proportional tax rate,
private investment spending is (1 − τs)I = D + A. If investment spending exceeds own
2In the following, we will suppress the argument I when convenient.
4funds, the ﬁrm has to borrow the remaining amount D from external sources. We assume
that external borrowing is done in the form of debt, new equity is excluded.3 To allow
for alternative tax systems, we also include a possible deduction of the cost of ﬁnance,
reﬂecting the expensing of interest on debt and an imputed cost of equity. The expected
value of net ﬁscal revenue G at the end of the period amounts to
T = τ [f − λi(D + A)+sI],G = pT − τsIR. (1)
The ﬁrm must pay back the upfront investment subsidy τsI when capital is disinvested.
A positive share s thus shifts the tax load from the beginning to the end of the period.
The parameter λ determines the share of ﬁnancing costs (for both debt and equity) that
can be deducted from the tax base when the returns from successful investment accrue,
and thus reduces the tax liability at the end of the period. The ﬁrm pays tax T only if
it is successful, giving expected tax revenue pT. The end of period value of the upfront
investment subsidy is τsIR.
Given that the government subsidizes a part τsI of total investment spending, a ﬁrm
with insuﬃcient own funds requires a credit D =( 1 − τs)I − A. The entrepreneur’s
opportunity cost of equity is AR. Similarly, the bank incurs reﬁnancing costs on the
d e p o s i tm a r k e te q u a lt oR per unit of lending. With the tax system deﬁn e da si n( 1 ) ,
private surplus or net value of the ﬁrm is divided according to
π
e = p(I + f − (1 + i)D − T) − AR,
π
b = p(1 + i)D − DR, (2)
π = p(I + f − T) − (1 − τs)IR.
In the absence of ﬁnancial frictions, banks can lend any amount subject to the break even
condition p(1 + i)=R. Perfect competition among banks imposes a zero proﬁtc o n d i t i o n
(πb =0 ) and determines the borrowing rate i w h i c hm u s te x c e e dt h ed e p o s i tr a t er by
3Our simple two state model cannot distinguish between debt and new outside equity, but this is also
not the focus of our analysis. See for instance Ellingsen and Kristiansen (2008) for an interesting but
more complicated approach that allows the endogenous determination of outside equity and debt.
5an intermediation margin that reﬂects the rate of business failure and subsequent credit
losses. The entrepreneur is the residual claimant of the ﬁrm and is entitled to the cash-
ﬂow after taxes and debts have been paid. Due to the zero proﬁt condition in banking,




(1 − τλ)(1− τs)
1 − τ
· i ≡ u. (3)
Thus, in the neoclassical model, the ﬁrm invests until the return on capital equals the
user cost. Both possibilities of tax deduction reduce the user cost of capital u.T h ef u l l
information case replicates the neutrality result of Bond and Devereux (2003) for cash-
ﬂow and ACE taxes. The cash-ﬂow tax allows for immediate expensing but denies any
deduction of the cost of ﬁnance, implying s =1and λ =0 . The ACE tax, on the other
hand, permits full deduction of ﬁnancing costs, including an imputed cost on equity, but
denies an upfront deduction for investment outlays, s =0and λ =1 . Both systems yield
f0 = i in (3) and thus lead to eﬃcient investment decisions when problems of corporate
governance are absent. Using p(1 + i)=R in (1), we ﬁnd that cash-ﬂow and ACE
taxes also yield the same level of net ﬁscal revenue G = pτ (f − iI) and are, thus, fully
equivalent in the unconstrained setting. The only diﬀerence between the two systems lies
in the timing of tax payments while the present value of tax revenue is the same. This
diﬀerence in timing is, however, irrelevant in a world without ﬁnancial frictions.
Cash-ﬂow and ACE taxes are known to be neutral in the standard model both in situa-
tions of certainty and uncertainty (Boadway and Bruce, 1984; Bond and Devereux, 2003).
Since they avoid investment distortions and yet raise revenue, they have attracted a lot of
attention in recent discussions of corporate tax reform (see Devereux and Sorensen, 2005;
OECD, 2007; Auerbach, Devereux, and Simpson, 2008; Griﬃth, Hines, and Sorensen,
2008). According to Bond and Devereux (1995, equation 6), an ACE tax system must
allow for the opportunity cost of ﬁnance, evaluated at the safe rate of interest r when
full loss-oﬀset is granted. Under these conditions, the period 1 tax liability with ACE
(s =0and λ =1 )w o u l db eT = τpf−τrI+τ [p(I − I) − (1 − p)I]. The square bracket
6lists the tax consequences of selling the asset. In the absence of depreciation, book value
equals market value, leaving a zero capital gain in case of success and a capital loss of −I
when the ﬁrm fails. With full loss-oﬀset, the ﬁrm must get a tax refund of −τrI − τI
from interest expensing and full loss-oﬀset when the market value falls to zero. Upon
rearranging, and noting the no-arbitrage condition (1 + i)p = R, expected tax liability
again is T = τ [p(I + f) − RI]=τp(f − iI) which corresponds to (1) with an ACE in
place. The present analysis assumes deduction of ﬁnancing costs at the risky loan rate i
without loss-oﬀset.B y( 1 ) ,t h eﬁrm owes τ (f − iI) if successful but receives no tax refund
when it fails, neither from interest deductions nor from capital losses. The expected tax
liability is the same under both assumptions. The two alternatives are equivalent.
2.2 Finance Constrained Investment
Will a tax system that is designed to be investment neutral for unconstrained ﬁrms still
be eﬃcient in the presence of ﬁnance constraints? To answer this question, we introduce
a moral hazard problem which creates a conﬂict of interest between outside investors and
the managing owner. We thus assume that the success probability of the ﬁrm depends
on managerial eﬀort which is not observable to outside investors. When the entrepreneur
exerts eﬀort, she generates a high success probability p, but must forego private beneﬁts.
Alternatively, she can spend only reduced eﬀort and, instead, consume private beneﬁts
B>0, leading to a low success rate pL <p .A f t e r e ﬀort is chosen, the state of nature
materializes. If the ﬁrm fails, no revenue is generated and it cannot repay its debt. If
it succeeds, debt and taxes are paid, and the entrepreneur consumes residual proﬁts.
The timing is thus: (i) government policy; (ii) external borrowing and investment; (iii)
managerial eﬀort; (iv) outcomes and payments depending on success or failure.
The corporate ﬁnance literature emphasizes that in many situations eﬀort is not veriﬁ-
able to outsiders and thus not contractible (e.g. Tirole, 2006). This creates a moral hazard
problem which requires incentives for managerial eﬀort and limits external ﬁnancing. The
entrepreneur chooses eﬀort after a bank loan has been secured, so debt is already given
7at this stage. To highlight the reward for eﬀort, we rewrite the entrepreneur’s surplus in
(2), using the deﬁnitions of user cost and external debt,
π
e = pv
e − AR, v
e ≡ I + f − T − (1 + i)D =( 1− τ)(f − uI)+( 1+i)A. (4)
Instead of high eﬀort, the entrepreneur can choose to shirk which reduces the ﬁrm’s
success probability to pL <p , but allows her to consume private beneﬁts B.W ea s s u m e
that these beneﬁts increase linearly with the investment level, B = bI, b>0.T h u s ,t h e




e + bI ⇔ v
e ≥ βI, β ≡ b/(p − pL). (5)
To elicit high eﬀort, outside investors must cede a large enough stake to the entrepreneur.
Using the deﬁnition of ve in (4), the total after-tax value from successful investment is
split between the entrepreneur and the bank, I + f − T = ve +( 1+i)D.S i n c e t h e
entrepreneur’s compensation must be at least βI to keep her properly incentivized, the
bank can demand at most (1+i)D ≤ I+f −T −βI as repayment. The right-hand side is
the ﬁrm’s pledgeable income, i.e. the maximum amount it can credibly promise to repay
that still assures high managerial eﬀort.
Repayment and bank lending are, therefore, constrained by pledgeable income. In
principle, the ﬁrm’s own equity A could be so large that the incentive constraint is slack
at the optimal investment level in (3). Despite the moral hazard problem, the solution
would be the same as in the preceding section. To exclude this case, we impose the
following assumption which leads to a credit constrained equilibrium:
1+i +( 1− τ)(f
0 − u) >β>(1 − τ)(f
0 − u) > 0. (A)
The last inequality implies that the (credit constrained) entrepreneur would like to invest
more as it would increase her compensation, dve/dI > 0.W h e nt h eﬁrm is credit rationed,
some proﬁtable investments with a return in excess of the user cost of capital, f0 >u ,
cannot be realized. The ﬁrm cannot get the additional funds. Starting from a constrained
situation of ve = βI, larger investment and debt would violate the incentive constraint
8due to the second inequality. The ﬁrst inequality implies that an increase in own equity
leads to a proportionately larger increase in investment so that there is a positive leverage
at the margin (see eq. 7 below). Figure 1 illustrates how, under these assumptions, the
incentive compatibility condition leads to constrained investment.
/
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τ
0
Fig. 1: Constrained Investment
Suppose now that (A) holds. The ﬁrm exhausts its debt capacity so that the incentive
constraint (5) is binding. Investment is thus implicitly determined by
(1 − τ)(f − uI)+( 1+i)A = βI. (6)
Assuming that the incentive constraint is also binding after a small change in exogenous
parameters, diﬀerentiating (6) shows how the investment level depends on the tax rate
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· ˆ β − εc · ˆ τ, m≡ β − (1 − τ)(f
0 − u), (7)










4The hat notation denotes percentage changes relative to initial values, ˆ I = dI/I. The exception are
tax prices such as ˆ τ = dτ/(1 − τ).
9Constrained investment again falls with the proﬁt tax. However, the mechanism is en-
tirely diﬀerent from the one driven by the user cost of capital in neoclassical investment
theory. Here, the tax liability reduces the ﬁrm’s pledgeable income that is available for
repayment to outside investors. Consequently, less external funding can be obtained and
total investment falls (see also Figure 1). Note that the total tax burden, and not the
marginal tax rate (as in the case of unconstrained ﬁrms), determines the distortion in
investment behavior. Investment is also sensitive to the corporate governance parame-
ter β. A fall in β implies that the incentive compatible compensation of entrepreneurs
can be reduced when the governance mechanisms improve so that managerial autonomy
and possibilities for shirking are restricted. The savings in managerial compensation also
boost pledgeable income and raise the ﬁrm’s borrowing capacity.
Internal funds A play a crucial role for investment behavior in the presence of moral
hazard. Under assumption (A), dI/dA > 1, i.e. the sensitivity of investment to A ex-
ceeds unity at the margin. The ﬁrm invests the additional internal funds and at the same
time raises more external debt to further expand investment. This scenario is particularly
relevant for small and new ﬁrms with little internal cash available for self-ﬁnancing. In
more mature ﬁrms with larger values of internal funds, the optimal unconstrained in-
vestment level might not exhaust their debt capacity, so that the incentive constraint (5)
is not binding and investment is determined by (3). Empirical evidence conﬁrms this
pattern that credit constraints tend to be more relevant for smaller ﬁrms (e.g. Beck,
Demirgüc-Kunt, and Maksimovic, 2005; Beck and Demirgüc-Kunt, 2006; Aghion, Fally,
and Scarpetta, 2007).
These results have important implications for empirical work concerned with the eﬀects
of business taxes on investment. The fundamental diﬀerences in investment decisions in
constrained and unconstrained ﬁrms call for a corresponding decomposition of the business
sector. For unconstrained ﬁrms, the standard tax augmented user cost of capital is the
relevant determinant of investment size. For constrained ﬁrms, however, the analysis
should take into account measures of own cash or assets and proxies for agency costs.
10The tax eﬀect is determined by the reduction in pledgeable income that is due to the tax
burden and does not depend on measures of marginal eﬀective tax rates.
The existence of ﬁnance constraints not only changes the impact of taxes on invest-
ment but fundamentally alters the eﬃciency properties of the tax as well. In our partial
equilibrium model, the appropriate welfare measure is the social surplus generated by a
ﬁrm which is the sum of private surplus plus the net value of public revenue. Adding (1)
and (2) and using p(1 + i)=R yields the social value π∗ = π + G = p(f (I) − iI) where
investment is determined in private equilibrium and depends on the tax rate as in (7).








The welfare change depends on the behavioral impact of the tax and is proportional to
the total wedge between the pre-tax rate of return f0 and the market rate of interest i.
This wedge is decomposed into a tax wedge u − i and an excess return f0 − u.T h et a x
wedge depends on the eﬀective marginal tax rate in the usual way.5 The excess return
arises because the ﬁnancing constraint limits investment to a level where the gross return
exceeds the cost of capital, f0 >u , leaving some proﬁtable investment opportunities
unexploited. Figure 1 illustrates.
Proposition 1 Even a small proﬁtt a xr a t ei m p o s e saﬁrst order welfare loss when in-
vestment is ﬁnance constrained.
If the tax rate is zero in the initial equilibrium, the user cost is equal to the loan rate,
u = i, which still leaves an excess return f0 >i . Introducing a small tax rate reduces
investment as in (7) and leads to a ﬁrst order welfare loss proportional to the excess
return on capital, dπ∗ = p(f0 − i)dI.I ft h eﬁrm were unconstrained, it would be able to
optimally expand investment until f0 = i, so that the welfare loss from a small tax would
be zero to the ﬁrst order.
5The eﬀective tax rate is deﬁned as τeff =( u − i)/u and relates the market loan rate to the pretax




11The question is whether ACE and cash-ﬂow taxes are still eﬃcient and equivalent when
investment is ﬁnance constrained. Both systems eliminate the tax wedge so that the user
cost is equal to the lending rate, u = i, and independent of the tax rate. However,
even if the tax is neutral with respect to the user cost, it still drains cash-ﬂow and
restricts investment since it is sensitive to cash-ﬂow. Noting du/dτ =0in (7), the
impact on investment simpliﬁes to dI/dτ = −(f − iI)/m,w h e r ef>i Iby concavity
and m>0 by Assumption A. Clearly, cash-ﬂow and ACE taxes are not neutral with
respect to investment when ﬁrms are ﬁn a n c ec o n s t r a i n e d ,a n dt h eb e h a v i o r a li m p a c to f
both tax regimes is identical. In consequence, the present value of net ﬁscal revenue,
G = pτ (f − iI),a n dw e l f a r e ,π∗ = p(f − iI), must both change by the same amount as
well. In particular, the welfare loss is again proportional to the excess return on capital
of a constrained ﬁrm, dπ∗ = p(f0 − i)dI.
Proposition 2 When investment is ﬁnance constrained, ACE and cash-ﬂow taxes (i) are
equivalent, and (ii) reduce investment and welfare.
The neutrality of ACE and cash-ﬂo wt a x e si nam o d e lw i t hf u l li n f o r m a t i o n( B o n da n d
Devereux, 2003) does not carry over to a situation when ﬁrms are ﬁnancially constrained.
Any tax system that leads to a reduction in pledgeable income has real consequences for
investment, independent of the eﬀect on user costs. However, in the simple moral hazard
problem considered here, it is only the present value of net tax liabilities that determines
the investment distortion. The timing of speciﬁc tax and subsidy levels has no additional
impact. For any given equity level A, the ACE system implies a larger pledgeable income
by giving tax relief at the return stage, but also requires more outside ﬁnancing because it
denies the tax subsidy at the early investment stage. The cash-ﬂow tax, instead, reduces
the need for outside ﬁnancing but also cuts into pledgeable income. ACE and cash-ﬂow
taxes turn out to be fully equivalent when banks are passive providers of outside ﬁnancing.
123 Active Financial Intermediation
This section extends the basic model by introducing a more active form of ﬁnancial inter-
mediation. Banks often play a productive role in situations where ﬁrms are closely tied
to one main bank or get ﬁnanced by other active intermediaries such as venture capital
ﬁrms. Indeed, monitoring is a main reason for the existence of ﬁnancial intermediation
(e.g. Diamond, 1984) and probably an indicator of ﬁnancial sector development. We show
that the timing of tax liabilities now becomes important: monitoring incentives of banks
will be stronger if the outstanding credit and, in turn, the promised repayment is larger.
Ac a s h - ﬂow tax system provides an upfront subsidy to investment and thereby reduces
the need for external ﬁnancing. Consequently, repayment is smaller which impairs moni-
toring incentives of banks and leads to larger failure rates. The lower success probability,
in turn, erodes the entrepreneurs’ incentives and makes it more expensive to incentivize
them. When insiders must keep a larger stake to assure full eﬀort, pledgeable income
declines and externally ﬁnanced investment falls as well.
3.1 A Model of Active Banks
To formalize the argument, we introduce an advising and monitoring role of banks that
raises a ﬁrm’s success probability and, thereby, the likelihood of repayment. As before,
high managerial eﬀort leads to a high success probability p>0. Shirking, for simplicity,
is assumed to result in sure failure, pL =0 , i.e. managerial eﬀo r ti st h u sc r u c i a lf o r
the survival of the ﬁrm. However, the success probability p depends not only on high
managerial eﬀort but also on a continuous monitoring decision. The bank can further
raise p by more intensive monitoring but incurs an intangible cost c(p)I which is propor-
tional to the investment level and convex increasing in p, c0,c 00 > 0. Both types of eﬀort
are non-contractible, giving rise to a double moral hazard problem. The surplus of the
13entrepreneur and the bank are now
π
e = p(I + f − T − (1 + i)D) − AR,
π
b = p(1 + i)D − DR− c(p)I, (9)
π = p(I + f − T) − c(p)I − (1 − τs)RI.
Debt D =( 1− τs)I − A,t a xT and net ﬁscal revenues G a r ea sb e f o r e ,s e e( 1 ) .
At the moral hazard stage, the credit contract, specifying the loan size D and the lend-
ing rate i, is already given. The entrepreneur chooses eﬀort, given the bank’s monitoring
activity. The bank chooses monitoring intensity that maximizes its surplus πb,g i v e nt h e
entrepreneur’s eﬀort. The two types of eﬀort are strategic complements: monitoring in-
centives are only positive when managerial eﬀort is high. Conversely, a higher monitoring
intensity raises success probability p and, thus, enhances the return to entrepreneurial
eﬀort. The two incentive constraints are
IC
e : β (p)I 6 v
e =( 1− τ)[f (I) − uI]+( 1+i)A, (10)
IC
b : c
0 (p)I =( 1+i)D,
where the user cost of capital u is deﬁned in (3) and β = b/p since pL =0 .
The lending rate is determined by competition among banks in the market for loans.
Since the lending rate and the debt and investment levels are already given at the moral
hazard stage, the bank’s incentive constraint ICb determines monitoring intensity and,
thus, the success probability p. Anticipating the decisions at the moral hazard stage,
ﬁrms wish to invest more and banks expand lending as long as the entrepreneur’s incentive
constraint is slack. Approving a larger loan size boosts the surplus of a bank by dπb/dD =
[p(1 + i) − R − c/(1 − τs)] > 0, which is positive as long as the break even condition
πb =[ p(1 + i) − R − c/(1 − τs)]D −Ac/(1 − τs) > 0 i sn o tv i o l a t e d .T h ec r e d i ti st h u s
increased until the anticipated incentive constraint of the entrepreneur is binding. As a
result, the two constraints in (10) jointly determine the investment level I and the success
probability p. The equilibrium values of the success probability and of investment and
credit size depend on the loan rate i and result in a given banking proﬁt.
14Competition in the credit market ﬁnally forces down the lending rate i and squeezes
proﬁts in banking until the zero proﬁt condition binds. Using the deﬁnition δ ≡ D/I ,
break even πb =0implies (p(1 + i) − R)δ = c(p). As opposed to the preceding section,
the intermediation margin must now cover the monitoring cost c and becomes endoge-
nous, leading to an endogenous loan rate. In what follows, we assume a functional form
c(p)=p1+γ/(1 + γ) for the monitoring cost. The speciﬁcation implies pc0 =( 1+γ)c,
which, together with the bank’s incentive constraint ICb a n db r e a k - e v e nc o n d i t i o n ,y i e l d s
p(1 + i)=R(1 + γ)/γ. Given the isoelastic speciﬁcation, the expected repayment per
unit of a loan is a constant mark-up over the exogenous deposit rate.
3.2 Comparative Statics
To avoid complicated tax base eﬀects, we start out from an untaxed equilibrium and limit
attention to small taxes only. The goal is, thus, to derive the eﬀects of a small proﬁt
tax τ on investment and monitoring intensity. The initial equilibrium being untaxed, we
evaluate the diﬀerentials at τ =0so that u = i initially. In (10), we see that investment
depends, among other variables, on the user cost. Diﬀerentiation of (3) gives the reaction
of ˆ u =ˆ ı +( 1− λ − s)ˆ τ. The lending rate i is determined by the zero proﬁt constraint
for banks. Given the above speciﬁcation of the monitoring cost, the expected return on a
bank credit contains a constant mark-up over the deposit rate, and the lending rate thus
only changes with the success probability: i ·ˆ ı = −(1 + i) · ˆ p. The diﬀerentiation of the
entrepreneur’s and the bank’s incentive constraints then yields
IC
e : m · ˆ I =( 1+f/I) · ˆ p − (f/I− (λ + s)i) · ˆ τ,
IC
b :( 1 + γ)δ · ˆ p = −s · ˆ τ + α · ˆ I,
where we have inserted the changes in u and i in ICe and used c0p = p1+γ in the diﬀer-
entiation of ICb. The share of equity is denoted by α ≡ A/I. Both incentive constraints
are thus increasing functions in the I,p-space. Stability requires that the slope of ICe is
higher than the slope of ICb. Otherwise, investment and monitoring intensity would not
15converge to ﬁnite positive levels after an exogenous shock. This condition requires that
∇≡(1 + γ)δm− (1 + f/I)α>0, leading to equilibrium changes in I and p,6
ˆ I = −
1
∇
[(f/I− (λ + s)i)(1+γ)δ +( 1+f/I)s] · ˆ τ, (11)
ˆ p = −
1
∇
[(f/I− (λ + s)i)α + ms] · ˆ τ.
Note that the factor f/I− (λ + s)i simpliﬁes to f/I − i under both cash-ﬂow and ACE
taxes. Knowing that f0 >iin credit constrained ﬁrms, and that f/I > f0 due to the
concavity of the production function, this expression is positive. The introduction of a
small proﬁt tax thus reduces both investment and the monitoring intensity. Finally, the
eﬀect on net ﬁscal revenue is
dG = pI [f/I− λi +( 1− R/p)s] · ˆ τ. (12)
Starting from an untaxed equilibrium excludes complicated tax base eﬀects.
3.3 ACE versus Cash-Flow Tax
In comparing ACE and cash-ﬂow systems, we set small tax rates such that both taxes yield
t h es a m en e tv a l u eo fg o v e r n m e n tr e v e n u e .W h a ta r et h e nt h ee ﬀects on investment and
monitoring under the two regimes, and how do they compare in eﬃciency terms? Suppose
a small cash-ﬂow tax, which deﬁnes the tax base by s =1and λ =0 , is introduced at a
rate ˆ τCF > 0. By (11), investment and monitoring intensity change by
ˆ ICF = −
(f/I− i)(1+γ)δ + f/I+1
∇
· ˆ τCF, ˆ pCF = −
(f/I− i)α + m
∇
· ˆ τCF. (13)
Net public revenue grows by dGCF = pI (f/I+1− R/p) · ˆ τCF.A nA C Et a xd e ﬁnes the
tax base by s =0and λ =1 .R a i s i n gt h es a m er e v e n u e ,dGACE = dGCF,r e q u i r e s
(f/I− i) · ˆ τACE =( f/I+1− R/p) · ˆ τCF. (14)
6Note that m is positive under assumption (A). The condition ∇ > 0 is fulﬁl l e da sl o n ga st h eﬁrm’s
own equity is not too high.
16An equal yield ACE system induces changes in investment and monitoring intensity of
ˆ IACE = −
(f/I+1− R/p)(1+γ)δ
∇
· ˆ τCF, ˆ pACE = −
(f/I+1− R/p)α
∇
· ˆ τCF. (15)
Ac a s h - ﬂow tax reduces investment and monitoring more than an equal yield ACE tax,
ˆ ICF < ˆ IACE < 0, ˆ pCF < ˆ pACE < 0. (16)
To see this, we compare the investment response in (13) and (15). The cash-ﬂow tax
discourages investment by more than an equal yield ACE tax if
1+f/I >(1 + γ)δ[p(1 + i) − R]/p ⇔ 1+f/I >(1 + i)δ.
The second inequality follows from the break-even condition [p(1 + i) − R]δ = c,a f t e r
applying pc0 =( 1+γ)c under the isoelastic speciﬁcation of monitoring cost and using
the bank’s incentive constraint c0 =( 1+i)δ in (10). This inequality is fulﬁlled since the
managerial incentive constraint in (10) requires ve > 0 and thus I + f − (1 + i)D>0
when evaluated at τ =0 . Monitoring is reduced more strongly under the cash-ﬂow tax if
m>[p(1 + i) − R]α/p ⇔ (1 + γ)δm > (1 + i)δα.
The second inequality follows by the same steps noted above. Since f/I >iunder ﬁnance
constraints and δ<1, the requirement that ∇ > 0 guarantees that this inequality holds.
The welfare consequences of these alternative tax systems are measured by the change
in the social surplus π∗ = p(I + f) − (R + c)I,
dπ
∗ =[ I + f − Ic
0]p · ˆ p +[ p(1 + f
0) − R − c]I · ˆ I. (17)
Substituting c0I =( 1+i)D from the bank’s incentive constraint (10) into the ﬁrst bracket
yields I+f−(1 + i)D = ve > 0 when the tax rate is zero at the outset. Hence, stimulating
monitoring would boost the entrepreneur’s surplus and, thus, yield an additional social
gain which banks do not take into account when choosing monitoring intensity. The
second bracket in (17) is also positive. Since f0 >iwith a binding ﬁnance constraint,
a larger investment scale ﬁnanced with more lending would raise the joint surplus by
17more than the bank’s proﬁta tt h em a r g i n ,p(1 + f0) − R − c>p (1 + i) − R − c>0,
with the diﬀerence going to the entrepreneur. The last inequality holds on account of
πb =0and δ<1 when ﬁrms have positive equity. Stimulating investment would thus
boost bank proﬁts which ﬁrms do not take into account. As neither side is able to fully
appropriate the social gains of their activities, investment and monitoring are too low in
private equilibrium relative to the ﬁr s tb e s ta l l o c a t i o n . 7 Having seen that even a small
tax reduces investment and monitoring, it removes their levels further from the ﬁrst best
allocation so that both tax regimes imply a ﬁrst order welfare loss. However, a cash-
ﬂow tax suppresses investment and monitoring to a larger extent and thus also imposes
a larger eﬃciency cost relative to an equal yield ACE system. The ACE tax is clearly
superior when banks not only supply credit but also perform valuable monitoring services
and thereby contribute to lower failure rates in business investment.
Proposition 3 When investment is constrained and monitoring raises success probabili-
ties, (i) ACE and cash-ﬂow taxes both reduce investment, monitoring and welfare, but (ii)
are no longer equivalent. An ACE system reduces investment, success rates and welfare
less than an equal yield cash-ﬂow tax.
Banks providing productive monitoring to ﬁrms face a typical hold-up problem: they
have to bear the full monitoring cost, but can only capture part of the returns, depending
on their stake δ in the ﬁrm. In giving an upfront subsidy, the cash-ﬂow tax requires
less external funding and therefore a smaller repayment. It thus reduces the bank’s out-
standing credit and impairs monitoring incentives. An ACE system, in contrast, provides
tax relief at the late return stage and, therefore, does not reduce external credit. With
a larger repayment at risk, banks monitor more intensively which contributes to lower
failure rates. Better success prospects, in turn, raise the returns to entrepreneurial eﬀort
which makes it cheaper to incentivize entrepreneurs. Hence, more intensive monitoring
feeds back positively on the incentive compatible investment scale of the ﬁrm. In a setting
7By (17), ﬁrst best monitoring and investment are given by 1+f/I = c0 and p(1 + f0)=c + R.
18of double moral hazard, the timing of tax payments becomes important which is more
favorable under the ACE tax. Given that the most innovative ﬁrms in the economy are
also those which are most likely to face ﬁnance constraints, this non-equivalence between
ACE and cash-ﬂow taxes could be rather important.8
Our analysis connects with the literature on eﬃciency in double moral hazard re-
lationships, see Holmstrom (1982) or McAfee and McMillan (1991). To overcome the
underinvestment problem and commit themselves to a larger eﬀort, team members could
deposit at the beginning an amount of cash with a third party (budget breaker). At the
end of the period, the deposit is paid back with interest only if the ﬁrm is successful.9
Since the entrepreneur has no more assets at hand, the deposit simply requires a larger
credit. The larger credit strengthens monitoring incentives of the bank while the repay-
ment of the deposit to the ﬁrm relaxes the entrepreneur’s incentive constraint. It can
be shown that such a private solution would stimulate investment and monitoring and
thereby reduce the need for corrective tax policy. However, such arrangements are not
observed in reality because, for example, the third party itself might be subject to moral
hazard (see Eswaran and Kotwal, 1984). The upshot is that the tax system can play the
role of a budget breaker. Moving from a cash-ﬂow to an ACE tax raises the tax liability
today (a deposit with the government) and gives tax relief tomorrow (repayment to ﬁrm).
8Proposition 3 mirrors the ﬁndings of Keuschnigg and Nielsen (2004) in the context of venture capital
ﬁnancing where a tax relief at the return stage was also found to provide superior incentives compared
to an upfront subsidy. Keuschnigg (2004) has shown that shifting the tax burden from the investment
to the return stage spurs long-run growth in innovative industries. These authors, however, allowed only
for a ﬁxed investment size while this paper endogenizes investment levels and establishes a close link to
the tax reform literature in public ﬁnance.
9In our model, the budget breaker could pay to the ﬁrm an amount ρ = zR/p if the deposit is z.
194C o n c l u s i o n s
This paper analyzes the eﬀects of corporate taxation when ﬁrms are ﬁnance constrained
due to moral hazard problems. The key insight of neoclassical investment theory that
taxes impair investment by raising the user cost of capital, is no longer complete. In-
dependent of their impact on user cost, taxes cut down investment by reducing a ﬁrm’s
pledgeable cash-ﬂow and its capacity to raise external funds. Investment becomes sensi-
tive to net of tax cash-ﬂo w .T h i sh a si m p o r t a n ti m p l i c a t i o n sf o rt h ee ﬃciency properties
of speciﬁct a xr e g i m e sw h i c hd i ﬀer substantially from the basic neoclassical investment
model with full information. First of all, proﬁt taxes impose strictly positive ﬁrst order
welfare losses even when tax rates are small. The welfare cost of taxes, as measured by
the marginal cost of public funds, is particularly severe in ﬁrms with low internal funds
and very tight credit constraints. Second, both cash-ﬂow and ACE taxes are no longer
neutral with respect to investment as they are in the basic neoclassical model with full
information. Although avoiding an increase in the user cost of capital, they still reduce
cash-ﬂow and, thereby, investment of constrained ﬁrms. Since young innovative ﬁrms with
l a r g eg r o w t hp r o s p e c t sa n dl i t t l eo w nf u n d sa r em o s tl i k e l yt ob eﬁnance constrained, the
non-neutrality is probably relevant for the most dynamic sectors of an advanced economy.
A third important implication for tax policy is that ACE and cash-ﬂow taxes might
not be equivalent as is commonly believed. The paper points to a situation where ﬁnancial
development and eﬃciency in banking is endogenous. When banks, in addition to giving
the required external funds, also perform important monitoring services, the success of
business investment not only depends on the eﬀort of inside entrepreneurs but also on
monitoring incentives. Given this double moral hazard, the timing of tax payments be-
comes important. Since an ACE tax gives tax relief at the late return stage, it is better
for incentives and leads to larger investment levels and success probabilities than an equal
yield cash-ﬂow tax which provides tax relief at the early investment stage.
20Appendix: Marginal Cost of Public Funds
To quantify the welfare consequences of ﬁnance constraints, we calibrate a numerical
example and compute the marginal cost of public funds (MCPF). We limit attention
to the case of passive banks with a ﬁxed loan rate as in Section 2 and consider a fully
distortive tax with no deductions (λ = s =0and G = pT = τpf). In the neoclassical
model, the ﬁrm invests until the return to investment equals the user cost, f0 = i/(1 − τ).
Log-diﬀerentiating condition (3) yields ˆ I = −ε · ˆ τ with an elasticity ε ≡− f0/(If00).T h e
marginal cost of public funds measures the change in private welfare per additional unit
of tax revenue, MCPF ≡− dπ/dG. The change in tax revenue consists of a direct
mechanical eﬀect and a behavioral eﬀect that reduces revenue by eroding the tax base,





where σ ≡ If0/f. The second equality
results when substituting the investment response. Investment being chosen to maximize
joint surplus π, a marginal change in the tax rate aﬀects private welfare by dπ/dτ = −pf.






For tax rates close to zero, the tax distortion of unconstrained investment vanishes, im-
plying a MCPF of unity. Higher tax rates, however, erode the tax base in proportion to
ε and lead to a progressively larger welfare loss.
In the constrained case, the tax elasticity of investment in (7) is εc =( 1− τ)f/(mI)
in the present case. Using the no arbitrage condition R =( 1 + i)p, private surplus
π = p[(1 − τ)f − iI] changes by dπ/dτ = −pf + p(1 − τ)(f0 − u)dI/dτ,w h e r et h e
excess return f0 − u is strictly positive. When investment is constrained, the envelope
theorem no longer applies. Inserting the investment response and combining with the








The main diﬀerence to (A.1) is in the numerator. The extra term with the excess return
f0 − u arises because proﬁtable investment opportunities are not fully exploited when
21the ﬁrm is constrained. Consequently, even small tax rates impose a ﬁrst order welfare
loss, making the marginal tax cost strictly larger than unity, MCPFc > 1.I m p o s i n g a
small tax on credit constrained ﬁrms leads to a higher eﬃciency loss than a corresponding
tax on unconstrained ﬁrms. Positive tax rates make a comparison more diﬃcult since the
elasticities ε and εc are, in general, diﬀerent. However, in the special case where ﬁrms have
no own equity (A =0 ) and technology is Cobb Douglas, it can be shown that ε = εc.10
Hence, in this case we clearly have MCPFc >MC PFfor all levels of the tax rate.
To illustrate the importance of ﬁnance constraints, we calibrate the MCPF in the
constrained and unconstrained model for diﬀerent tax rates τ. At present, statutory rates
typically lie between 20-40% in OECD countries, with a falling tendency (cf. OECD,
2007). We consider the values {0,.1,.2,.3,.4} for τ. The empirical literature reports loan
rates on business credit around ten percent, so we set i = .1 (cf. Petersen and Rajan,
1994; Degryse and Ongena, 2005). Tirole (2006, p. 98) reports a ratio of debt to equity
slightly above 2, implying an equity ratio of around one third. We set α = A/I = .3
in the baseline scenario, but also consider α =0to capture the impact of very severe
ﬁnancing problems of young ﬁrms. Empirical studies estimating the cash-ﬂow sensitivity
of investment support a value of μ = dI/dA =( 1+i)/m =1 .3 (cf. Fazzari and Petersen,
1993; Calomiris and Hubbard, 1995; Carpenter and Petersen, 2002). To illustrate the
sensitivity of MCPFc with respect to this parameter, we also consider values {1,1.15}.
Finally, assuming a Cobb Douglas technology, the capital elasticity of output σ is set
t oat y p i c a lv a l u eo fσ = .3. Given parameters τ, i, α, μ, σ, the cash-ﬂow sensitivity
μ =( 1+i)/m and the incentive constraint β =( 1− τ)f (I)/I − i +( 1+i)α from (6)
can be solved for I and β:
I =
∙
(1 − τ)(1− σ)
(1 + i)(1/μ − α)
¸1/(1−σ)
,β =( 1− τ)/I
1−σ − i +( 1+i)α, A = α · I. (A.3)
10A technology f = Iσ implies ε =1 /(1 − σ). For the constrained case with A =0 ,i n s e r t i n gβ from
(6) into the deﬁnition of m yields mI =( 1− σ)(1 − τ)f, leading to εc =1 /(1 − σ) as well.
22These calibrated values are used in (A.2) to compute the MCPFc:
Table 1: MCPF with Finance Constraints
MCPF τ =0 τ = .1 τ = .2 τ = .3 τ = .4
Unconstrained investment:
MCPF 1.000 1.050 1.120 1.225 1.400
Constrained investment (μ = dI/dA =1 .3):
α = .3 1.143 1.177 1.223 1.287 1.385
α =0 1.310 1.376 1.468 1.605 1.835
μ =1 1.209 1.251 1.307 1.387 1.511
μ =1 .15 1.176 1.214 1.265 1.337 1.447
The ﬁrst row of results gives the MCPF when ﬁrms are not constrained. The excess
burden is zero in the untaxed equilibrium, but rises progressively with higher tax rates.
The row α = .3 refers to the benchmark scenario in the model with credit constraints.
The MCPFc measure is signiﬁcantly higher for small tax rates, but falls below the value
f r o mt h en e o c l a s s i c a lm o d e lw h e nt h et a xr a t ei sh i g h . T h i si sd u et ot h ef a c tt h a tt h e
elasticity of investment with respect to the tax rate εc is lower than the corresponding
elasticity in the unconstrained case, so a change in the tax rate then has a smaller impact
on the MCPFc. The derivative of εc shows that this elasticity decreases with higher
values of own assets A, meaning that the ﬁnance constraint becomes less severe as A
rises. So reducing A to zero (α =0 ) leads to very high eﬃciency costs of taxation. The
t w ob o t t o mr o w si nT a b l e1s h o wt h a ti ns i t u a t i o n si nw h i c hﬁrms can only raise very low
levels of outside debt for an additional unit of own funding, the tax-induced reduction in
pledgeable income also leads to greater losses in eﬃciency.
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